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ABSTRACT 
Past, current and future military endeavors will 
invariably involve conflict at the sub-state level.  A 
recurring problem in the study of insurgent conflict is a 
lack of data that has the breadth, depth, and historical 
accuracy to provide insight as to why, at the individual 
level, people participate in insurgency.  Accessibility to 
street gangs provides a comprehensive source of data not 
seen in insurgencies.  Street gangs provide a “ground 
truth”, to the interaction between the state and organized 
sub-state group in a competition for control.   
The individuals who fuel both sides of this 
competition for control are basing decisions to participate 
in insurgency on a framework founded in rational actor 
theory, but modified by their perspective of the world.  
Groups who wish to recruit individuals into their 
insurgency apply incentives and disincentives selectively 
to individuals to compel membership.  As a group gains more 
members it can apply more incentives, increasing the rate 
or future recruitment and level of control over a 
community. 
A comprehensive and effective strategy cannot be 
developed to counter these insurgent forces without 
answering the fundamental questions behind individual 
participation first. This thesis examines insurgency from 
the individual level and proposes concepts that must 
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A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to explain individual 
participation in insurgent organizations.  Past, current 
and future military operations will invariably involve 
conflict at the sub-state level.  These sub-state conflicts 
go by many names: guerrilla war, rebellion, and revolution.   
For the purpose of this thesis, the term insurgency is 
defined as a popularity based conflict for control of a 
fixed political space between a sovereign government and a 
sub-state group.1  A recurring problem in the study of 
insurgent conflict is a lack of data that has the breadth, 
depth, and historical accuracy to provide insight as to 
why, at the individual level, people participate in 
insurgencies.  Accessibility to street gangs provides a 
comprehensive source of data not seen in insurgencies.2  
Street gangs provide “ground truth” to the interaction 
between the state and organized sub-state groups in a 
competition for control.   
The individuals who fuel both sides of this 
competition for control are basing decisions to join, 
participate in insurgency, or passively support an 
insurgency on a decision framework described best by a 
rational actor theory3. This rational decision is based on 
                     
1 This definition is developed from the Naval Postgraduate School 
Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare, McCormick, Gordon. January 2005 
2 Irving A. Spergel, The Youth Gang Problem (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995),16-24 
3 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1995) ,5-13 
- Graham Allison and Phillip Zalikov, Essence of Decision (New York: 
Longmann Press, 1999) 
2 
the individual’s perception of society and the values of 
benefits and costs for different decisions.  Individuals in 
insurgent neighborhoods have common frames of the costs for 
action.  The individual’s perspective of the world serves 
as the foundation for any participation in an insurgency.  
The costs and benefits of decisions are bounded by the 
individual’s perspective of the world.4  This bounded 
perspective is a common frame as defined later in this 
thesis.  The common frame is looked at by the individual as 
a reference for values to the benefit and cost elements of 
the rational actor model.  This complex, rich and 
reinforcing rational choice framework explains why 
individuals join, participate in, and support insurgent 
groups.  
Ultimately, the decision to join a rebel group is 
greatly influenced by the individual or group that has the 
most control of the neighborhood.  As control is exerted 
over individuals or groups, the rational actor model is 
correspondingly influenced.  The influence groups exert 
over individuals changes the individual’s perception of 
costs and benefits over time as multiple iterations of the 
rational actor model are executed.    More exertion of 
control over individuals in a neighborhood, serves to 
further change the values of benefits or costs within the 
rational actor model of the individuals.      
To develop a comprehensive and effective strategy to 
counter insurgencies the fundamental questions concerning 
participation must be answered.  This thesis examines the 
reasons for participation in rebellion and proposes 
                     4 Allison, 10-36. 
- Lichbach,  12-26. 
3 
concepts that must accompany any attempt to combat rebel 
groups in their fight for control. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The examination of insurgencies and theories to 
understand them are taken from two perspectives:  the macro 
level perspective and the micro level perspective.  
Differences at the macro or organizational level may lead 
some to disregard similarities between street gangs and 
insurgencies.  Contrary to this are the fundamental micro 
or individual level similarities explaining participation 
and passive support at the individual level.  These 
similarities transcend macro differences. 
1. Macro Differences 
At the macro level, the insurgency is competing 
through the combined use of political rebellion and 
military force to bring about change at the societal and 
political level.  This rebellion from authority is 
fundamentally different from the organized street gang in 
both scope and purpose.  The insurgent’s goal is the 
modification of state authority, while the street gang 
looks for monetary gain.  Control for the gang is a 
function of its desire to attain wealth.  The gang is a 
parasite, while the insurgent movement seeks total change 
for the existing state.  These macro differences are 
functions of the organizational goals and not the 
individual motivators.  To understand, and ultimately 
defeat the gang or insurgency the individual motivators for 
participation in rebellion must be identified. 
2. Micro Similarities 
The micro level demonstrates fundamental similarities 
between the insurgency and the street gang at three levels:  
4 
The individual choice to join, to stay in, and the decision 
to passively support by not fighting the insurgent or 
street gang.   
a. The Commonality of Control 
Both the gang and the insurgency share the 
necessity of control.  The street gang requires control at 
the local level to ensure profits.  The street gang 
maximizes its financial gains through localized control of 
neighborhoods and communities. To attain the macro level 
goal of regime change the insurgency similarly requires 
control at the local level.  Without control, neither the 
insurgency nor the gang can achieve their goals.   
To maintain this necessary control, both the gang 
and the insurgency use coercion and intimidation. This 
coercion has the ability to manipulate the community and 
the community’s perceptions of society within which it 
exists.  The individuals within a community share a common 
frame of the power of a gang.  This common frame maintains 
the gang as a lynchpin in assessing the values of benefits 
and costs in making rational decisions.  This in turn 
affects the control the gang or insurgency has over the 
individual.  The dynamic of control by the gang or 
insurgency allows for a shaping of the expectations of 
individuals and the associated costs of action both in and 
out of the neighborhood.  As individuals believe in the 
controls of the gang or insurgency, the power of the group 
grows.5  The result is a self-perpetuating mechanism of 
control over both the individual and the community. 
                     5 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical 
Essay of Insurgent Conflicts  (Chicago:The Rand Corporation, 1970),28-46. 
5 
This thesis demonstrates that individuals join 
gangs and insurgencies because their perspective of society 
leads them to rebellion. This decision to join comes about 
because the individual determines that joining in rebellion 
is the most efficient means to achieve their desires.  Many 
of these pressures are rooted in a perception of 
frustration in the opportunities viewed in society. Members 
of the Crips, Bloods, Lions, Ansar al Sunna, and FMLN all 
maintain membership in these organizations for the same 
core reasons.  We will show that they see membership as a 
way to achieve personal gain at minimal cost and a minimum 
of frustration. 
b. Common Aspect of Passive Support 
Passive support is common in any community.  
Individuals do not see an associated evil with inaction.  
In contrast to this sentiment that there is no evil in 
inaction, the street gang and the insurgency both rely upon 
passivity to maximize their benefits.  Passivity is a form 
of endorsement.  Communities do not see their inactivity as 
contributing to the problem, but to the insurgency and gang 
passivity is a tool. The gang or insurgency must secure 
community passivity to ensure authorities cannot collect 
intelligence on the illegal activities of the group.  
Passive support and overcoming it is at the core of 
confronting and changing the individual’s perception of the 
values of the benefits and costs to their decisions 
established by the gang or insurgent group.  The passivity 
of the neighborhood, shared with gangs and insurgencies is 
a collective action dilemma.6  There is little incentive to  
 
                     6 Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Cooperators Dilemma (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1996),5-24. 
6 
entice individual participation. The result in both 
instances is common inaction despite collective need for 
action. 
c. Commonality of the Underworld 
The clandestine or illegal nature of the 
insurgency and the gang is another similarity.  Both 
entities rely upon illegal activities to achieve their 
macro goals. Both the gang and the insurgency operate in 
Bell’s Dragonworld.7 This world, occupied by individuals who 
are in hiding from lawful authorities, is filled with 
obstacles due to the necessity of staying out of sight of 
authorities.  To operate in the dragonworld simple 
communication and recruitment of new members is hampered by 
authorities and requires more forethought to prevent 
capture.  They suffer in similar manners by having to use 
clandestine networks of information and often have to evade 
authorities.  In this fashion, gangs and insurgencies both 
foster the same mentality among their members.  Leaving the 
clandestine world is a deliberate and planned act for both 
the insurgency and the gang.    
d. Similarities in Membership  
The final similarity is membership in an 
insurgent group. It is very different from that of a 
conventional or even traditional guerrilla army.  The 
insurgency, especially an urban insurgency, does not have 
standing armies of individuals separated from home and 
family unless taking leave from the battlefield.  The urban 
insurgent, like the gang member, goes home at the end of 
the battle.  Often the home is a staging point for 
operations and serves as a support base. The gang member                      
7 Bell, J. Bowyer, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert 
Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem” Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter Intelligence, Vol.3(1) 15-43. 
7 
sleeps in his own bed, does not campaign like a traditional 
army and shares the aspects of the urban insurgent. This 
concept of part time membership is based on the desire to 
achieve personal gain, monetary or other benefit.  As the 




These micro level similarities serve as a basis to 
examine street gangs to determine insurgent motivation.  
Understanding the gang is critical to understanding the 
complexity of an individual’s decision to participate in 
violent activity.  As the reasons for gang membership are 
determined and understood, they can be transferred to the 
insurgent motivators.  This will provide the ability to 
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II. THEORY 
A. PAST APPROACHES 
Past approaches examining insurgencies, and what 
motivated them looked toward the societal phenomenon, the 
organization phenomenon, or the aggregate of individual 
preferences to make up the forces of revolution.  The 
societal approaches to understanding insurgencies are 
exemplified by Chalmers Johnson’s systems disequilibrium 
approach, Marx’s structural approach, and Tilly’s 
opportunity/resource approach.8  In each of these cases, a 
macro analysis is taken of the society to explain why 
revolution is taking place. The organizational approach 
developed by William Bender and Craig Johnson examines the 
insurgency as an organization within a market.  This 
organizational approach attempts to fill the void between 
the societal approach and the individual approach to 
explaining rebellion.  
Mark Lichbach, Craig Johnson and William Bender split 
the final approach to examining rebellion, at the 
individual level, into two camps: the rational actor model 
rooted in Mancur Olson’s theories of rational actors or the 
relative deprivation theory developed by Ted Robert Gurr 
in, Why Men Rebel.9  Mancur Olson’s central thesis to the 
rational actor in a collective group was that “only a 
separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a 
rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-
                     8 Gareth G. Davis, “Repression, Rationality and Relative Deprivation; 
A Theoretical and Impirical Examination of Cross-Cultural Variations in 
Political Violence.” (Ph.D. diss. George Mason University, 2005),12-15. 
9 Tedd Robert Gurr., 15-46 Why Men Rebel. (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1971), 15-46.- Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 5-12 
10 
oriented way”; that is, only a benefit reserved strictly 
for individual group members will motivate one to join and 
contribute to the group.10 This means that individuals will 
act collectively to provide private goods, but not to 
provide public goods.  
Relative deprivation views individuals as becoming 
frustrated in their current environment.  This frustration 
stems from viewing better conditions elsewhere and being 
unable to attain them in a just manner.  This frustration 
leads to violence directed at the source of the 
deprivation.  Although relative deprivation has its merits, 
its foundation of individual psychological grievances 
limits its expansion to greater collective movements.  
Relative deprivation has been proven to exist at the 
individual level by psychologists and appears consistent 
between individuals.  Gareth Davis, in studies comparing 
rational actor models with relative deprivation proved that 
relative deprivation could not be consistently proven at 
the national level.11  This disconnect between individual 
and national relative deprivation prevents its further use. 
Each of these theories contains limitations when 
viewed with respect to the actual actions of individuals.  
The authors determined that individuals are rational, but 
the values used in a rational actor model are subject to 
the perceptions of the individual making the choice.  To 
explain this phenomenon the authors conducted primary and 
secondary research to develop a theory to explain this 
occurrence.  
 
                     10 Davis, p.12-15 
11 Davis, p.2-10 
11 
B. INDIVIDUALS AS RATIONAL ACTORS IN THE INSURGENCY 
At the core of the decisions addressed in this thesis 
is the rational choice model of decision making.  
Individuals are rational beings.  At least a majority of 
individuals make decisions through a subconscious rational 
choice. Individuals weigh the benefit of action and the 
expectation of receiving that benefit minus the cost of the 
decision and the expectation of receiving that decision.  
For the majority of the decisions in an individual’s life 
these cost and benefit analyses go on without conscience 
efforts to calculate the decision.  Most individuals arrive 
at the conclusion from a subconscious effort.    
1. Rebel Group 
A rebel group is any organization of three or more 
individuals who desire to control a fixed political space.  
This group may desire to control a city block or an entire 
country.  Their motives may be economic or they may be 
religious, in any case the group desires to usurp the 
authority of the existing state to achieve the rebel groups 
own agenda.   
Around the world, rebel groups are constantly in a 
state of competition with sovereign governments.  In the 
United States, street gangs represent a rebel group that 
strives to control city blocks at a time for economic gain 
and empowerment of individuals.  These rebel groups apply 
selective incentives and disincentives to manipulate the 
rational decisions of individuals 
2. Selective Incentive 
A selective incentive is any input, benefit or cost, 
in a rational decision that provides a motive or deterrence 
for an individual to take particular course of action, or 
12 
counts as a reason for preferring one choice to the 
alternatives. The incentives are not universal to everyone, 
nor are they always applied. Organizations or individuals 
with control in the community apply incentives or 
disincentives to influence the rational decision making of 
specific individuals or groups of individuals.  Street 
gangs use threats of violence towards individuals to gain 
compliance.  The gang uses personal harm as a disincentive 
for going against it.  At the same time the gang can 
propose monetary or power gains for assistance, very real 
selective incentives to some individuals. 
3. Expectations 
Expectations are directly linked to selective 
incentives and the general perception of benefits and 
costs.  Individuals associate an expectation of receiving a 
benefit or cost when they make rational decisions. 
Individuals will also tie expectations to the selective 
incentives based on the credibility of the individual 
attempting to use a selective incentive.  The gangs in most 
cities establish themselves as capable of violence early 
on.  The knowledge that the gang is capable of inflicting 
harm provides high expectation of costs. 
4. Common Frame of Control and Authority Between 
Individuals 
David Snow and his colleagues propose, “By rendering 
events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to 
organize experience and guide action, whether individual or 
collective.”12 The frames, although individually developed, 
become part of a common understanding of society both 
locally and in general.  This common frame is how an entire 
                     
12 Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Wordon, and 
Robert D. Benford. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review (1986), 464-81. 
13 
neighborhood could develop, over time, a common memory or 
understanding of how neighborhood works.  Importantly, the 
common frame serves as a record within the neighborhood of 
events. 
Individuals in the neighborhood have common frames of 
the world around them.  Through the common act of 
socialization, individuals communicate the values of 
benefits and costs.  They also communicate the expectations 
of receiving these benefits and costs.  Quintan Wiktorowicz 
explains that as individuals communicate socially “They 
offer a language and cognitive tools [to each other] for 
making sense of events and experiences by interpreting 
causation, evaluating situations, and offering proscriptive 
remedies.”13 
This is similar to a theory by Kurt Lewin.  Lewin’s 
theory, which explains why people acted the way they did, 
proposed that understanding past action was critical to 
future motivation of individuals.  The basis of Lewin’s 
theory is that both the person and the environment they 
occupy determine all behavior.  The person and the 
environment act together to comprise an imaginary mental 
sphere he called a life space.  Life space is a 
psychological picture, which depicts all the facts that 
determine behavior at a particular moment in time.  This 
life space sphere is then divided into numerous 
subdivisions representing how a person perceives his or her 
environment.14  This influences their decisions.  This life 
                     13 Quintan Wiktorowicz. “JOINING THE CAUSE: AL-MUHAJIROUN AND RADICAL 
ISLAM.” (Department of International Studies, Rhodes College, 2005) 
14 Celest Brignac, Mississippi State University: Effective Teacings 
in Agriculture website.  (Electronic resource accessed January 12, 
2006) www.ais.msstate.edu\TALS\index  
14 
sphere changes with the changing situations in life.The 
impact of this fluctuating perspective is that the 
individual’s value judgment of the costs and benefits in a 
rational actor model continuously adjusts to account for 
the continuously changing world they live in.15  
5. Control 
When tied to the term insurgency, control is defined 
as the ability to see everything that happens in a given 
political space and have the ability to affect it.16  
Control is a core element to the rational actor model.  
Individuals or groups that exert control within a 
neighborhood have the ability to change the outcome of an 
individual’s decisions.    
 
C. THEORY 
1. Rationality and Neighborhood Control 
The methodology of the thesis uses three of the micro 
level similarities between traditional insurgencies and 
street gangs to understand why people participate in 
insurgencies.  The authors developed a framework to explain 
how gangs operate within the social environment and answer 
three questions: why people join gangs, why they stay in 
gangs and why do they passively support gangs.  Based on 
the answers from these three questions we expect to be able 
to explain the social interactions that lead a gang or 
rebel group to hold a pervasive level of control over a 
neighborhood or area.  The conclusion can then be applied 
to insurgencies to increase overall understanding of 
                     15 Kurt Lewin,Dynamic theory of personality. Selected papers.(New York,1935)  
Kurt Lewin, Field theory in social science. (New York,1951)  
16 Gordon McCormick. Interview with Authors, February 2006 
15 
insurgencies at the fundamental level and how best to 
target the controls that a rebel group has within the 
neighborhood or area.   
The reasons individuals participate in gangs and 
insurgencies can sometimes be troubling and difficult to 
understand. One of the first steps to understanding 
insurgencies and gangs is to look at how they are able to 
develop the control necessary to operate and get people to 
participate in a given neighborhood.  To explain the 
reasons for participation, the authors developed a 
framework that explains why and how an individual, or group 
of individuals, make decisions that leads them to 
participating in rebel activity. 
The authors’ theory starts from the cornerstone that 
individuals are rational actors. Using rational actor as 
the basis the authors define how gangs and insurgencies are 
able to get participation from the communities they affect. 
Within the supply based analysis of insurgencies developed 
by Lietes and Wolf in Rebellion and Authority: An 
Analytical Essay of Insurgent Conflicts17 they explain how 
and why an insurgency establishes control within an area. 
Using selective incentive the rebel group is able to 
mobilize resources.  Within this paper we are looking at 
mobilizing participation and the development of control. 
The authors of this thesis then apply the rational actor 
model to individual decision within the gang neighborhood 
and show how the individual decisions lead to common frames 
within the rebel group or gang area.  The authors believe 
that when the common frames established and understood 
throughout a community, then the control that the rebel 
                     17 Leites, 28-46 
16 
group has developed will be clear to see, and in turn will 
give the reader a better understanding of why people 
participate in insurgent activity. 
Through research, the authors identified specific 
cultural and environmental characteristics that contribute 
to the gang participation.  The authors view these 
characteristics as additional conditions.  These 
characteristics are not directly tied to the rebel activity 
but further explain why individual participate in rebel 
activity.  These additional conditions explain the 
phenomenon that gives individuals specific values for cost, 
benefits and expectations for rational decisions.  The 
authors believe that these additional conditions also need 
to be understood to see the entire picture of why people 
participate in rebel activity.  In the following part of 
this chapter, the authors will further describe their 
theory of rational actions forming a common frame that 
leads to a more complete understanding of the controls 
exerted by a rebel group by further explaining each sub 
portion of the theory.  In the conclusion of the thesis the 
authors will show that from understanding of basic 
individual decisions a common frame can be defined.  Using 
the developed common frames and the additional conditions 
from the area, the controls that the rebel group applies 
over the people will be clear to see and in turn provide 
for a more efficient way to target the rebel group’s 
control and the reasons people participate in gangs or 
insurgencies. 
2. Rational Actor Model 
Individuals decide to act as described by the rational 
actor model.  The individual weighs the value of a benefit 
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and the expectation of receiving that benefit, minus the 
value of costs and the expectation of that cost to 
determine whether to join or not join the gang.  The 
equation is simple.  The important aspect of the equation 
is that it is continuously being applied to all decisions.  
The individual assesses the values of costs and benefits 
every moment of every day.18  The values for each of the 
four variables are determined through the individual’s 
perception through the frame.  Any group or individual that 
exerts control over that environment can affect the common 
frame, therefore changing the values of the four variables. 
The sum of the neighborhoods decisions over time change the 
common frame of the neighborhood.  
By using this methodology described, it is possible to 
derive the motivators for making single decisions, and 
place them in perspective to the overall decision-making 
process of the individual and the common frame.  The 
outcome of this process is a determination of how the 
common frame provides information that individuals use in 
making decisions and which groups have control over the 
neighborhood. 
The concept behind selective incentive is critical to 
understanding that individuals will make rational choices 
based on the expectation of selective incentives being 
applied to them.  An individual will work towards their 
preferences, but the selective incentives will create 
boundaries to their attempts to achieve the preferences. 
The rationality applied to weighing selective incentives, 
expectations and preferences is relative to given attitudes 
                     
18 The four values for the rational actor are: the expectation for 
receiving a benefit, the benefit itself, the expectation of receiving a 
cost, the costitself. (Eb*B)-(Ec*C)=Decision 
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and beliefs. People act to advance their pure preferences, 
but the common frame tempers those actions.19   
Expectations are directly linked to selective 
incentives.  The individual understands expectations of 
receiving selective incentives based on the common frame 
they live in.  With the changing dynamics of the common 
frame, the expectations of receiving selective incentives 
also change. 
3. Rebel Group Fundamentals, Understanding Control 
and Participation 
The rational decision happens in all communities.  The 
major change in a gang or insurgent neighborhood is control 
exerted by some groups other then the state or government.  
When looking at a rebel group’s environment all decisions 
are greatly influence by the pervasive control exerted by 
the rebel group in the neighborhood.  Gangs and 
insurgencies are able to exist and operate because they 
have established control over time.  As the rebel groups 
establish their ability to control the environment the 
state or government then sees a reduction in their ability 
to exert control. When a rebel group exerts control over a 
community it has the effect of changing the way 
individual’s perceive the influences on their decision 
making.  The rebel groups control guarantees the 
expectation for the selective incentives that can be 
provided to the individual.  This in turn, changes the 
benefit and cost relationship with all the individuals 
other influences.  When the rebel groups controls an area 
there is a high degree of certainty the gangs influence 
will affect an individual and a low degree of certainty the 
                     19 Michael Taylor, Rationality and Revolution. (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991)63-97 
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state incentives will affect an individual’s decision.  The 
result is a system that gives an advantage in rational 
decisions to the rebel group that has established control 
of an area.  This situation changes the common frame over 
time, and people assume the gang knows what decision they 
will make, so most decision are based using this knowledge, 
even if it is only based on a perception of control. 
4. Common Frame’s Role 
A common frame, as the authors define it, is a 
collection of individual interpretations of all the 
decisions that are made by the individuals within a 
community over time.  The common frame, when in place, 
allows individuals to shape what they see in the 
neighborhood and more importantly how it is seen.  The 
existence of this common frame gives the occupants of a 
neighborhood or area the understanding, either real or 
perceived, of who has control of a given area and who can 
effectively apply selective incentives.  This common frame 
within the neighborhood is a guide for an individual to 
understand the value of various costs and benefits and the 
expectation of receiving these costs and benefits.  It is 
important to understand that as individuals socialize a 
collection of experiences from the neighborhood or area 
develops.  This provides the people within the area an 
understanding of how the area operates.  It is essentially 
the result of thousands of rational decisions over time 
being shared through socialization. Members in the 
community share their values in the rational decision model 












Figure 1.   Growth of Control [From Common Frames.] 
 
Socialization provides the means to convey the values 
in the rational actor model.  Rebel groups foster a common 
frame of their control to undermine the authority of the 
state and develop new sources of inputs. 
The result of this socialization is an understanding 
of how rebel groups maintain control without vast amounts 
of coercion.  This conversion of authority into inputs is 
explained as the ability to apply selective incentives to 
coerce individuals into providing inputs.  Often in 
insurgencies and especially in gangs, coercion is minimal.  
The question then to answer is how authority, or as the 
authors would describe it “control” provides inputs without 
direct coercion.  The hypothesis of the authors provides 
the answer to that question.  
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5. Additional Conditions 
The complexity of human nature and the interaction of 
individuals necessitates including factors that influence 
the rational actor model, but are not accounted for in 
socialized contexts. Pre-existing facts or biological 
conditions will always influence individuals in their 
choices.  These pre-existing factors or conditions are 
explained through out the thesis as additional conditions.  
additional conditions are often simple common sense 
factors, but still require addressing. 
Although, these additional conditions can be reduced 
to values within the rational actor model, they are not 
reduced because they convey important insurgent phenomenon.  
If reduced to mere values, these additional conditions 
would loose the perspective of their effect across 
cultures, groups, and situations.  
6. Limitations 
The limitations to this approach are found in two 
parts.  The first is in the hypothesis explaining 
individual decision-making.  The authors applied a hybrid 
of multiple theories that when combined overcame individual 
theory weaknesses.  The modified rational actor theory used 
inherits some of the weaknesses of the parent model.   
For the rational actor theory, its weakness is found 
in the definition of rationality.  Graham Allison defined 
it as, “Consistent, value maximizing choice within 
specified choice.”20  Further Allison points out that by 
using limited rationality to explain behavior is, “Assuming 
an economic definition of the situation, economists impose 
a benchmark that stipulates the content of the ‘values,’ 
                     20 Allison, 31. 
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‘alternatives,’ and ‘consequences’ in the rigorous model.  
This leads many economists to overlook a wide range of 
values and consequences that are important to students of 
politics, psychological, and sociological behavior.”21   
The second possible weakness is in the research data.  
Time and resources limited the primary research breadth to 
a single city.  To overcome this breadth secondary sources 
augment the primary research data.  The initial argument of 
similarities between all rebel groups is used to push the 
theory beyond the confines of the one research city. 
D. RESEARCH SUBJECT 
1. Why Second Generation Gangs 
This thesis examines second-generation gangs to 
explain insurgent behavior.  Max Manwaring classifies gangs 
into three categories.22  First generation gangs are those 
which develop and disband in a somewhat random manner.  
These groups of mostly young males are organized based on 
local connectivity and a collective desire to fulfill some 
youthful angst, or what Thrasher would call, “Wanderlust.”23 
Second generation gangs are more permanent in nature.  The 
specific membership may shift, but the organization as a 
whole persists in a sub-state manner.  In the United 
States, these gangs may span multiple cities or even cross 
state lines, but are not international actors.  These 
second-generation gangs affect their local neighborhoods in 
a profound and enduring fashion.  This enduring nature 
                     21 Allison, 32. 
22 Nicholas Haussler, „“Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq 
Insurgency.“(Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005)2-35 
- - Max G. Manwaring, „Sreet Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency.“ Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Pennslyvania 2005. 
23 Thrasher, 147. 
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along with accessibility provides readily available 
research material for insurgency theorists. Third 
generation gangs are transnational, industrial gangs.  
Third generation gangs stand on the shoulders of the first 
and second generation gangs for local influence, thereby 
negating their use for understanding interaction at the 
local level.  These gangs have been examined in the past 
for counterinsurgency theory, but due to their nature, they 
provide insight into operating techniques and not 
individual or collective motivators.24 
Military intervention in insurgent conflicts usually 
follows other attempts to combat rebel groups.  In this 
fashion, the military most often fights an existing 
insurgent organization.  Prevention of insurgent activity 
is primarily a political and police function.  If rebellion 
is kept in check by political or police endeavors the 
military will never be utilized.  This timing, dealing with 
an existing organization, is similar to that of cities 
dealing with street gangs.  The gangs already exist on the 
streets and strategies to defeat them are centered on 
defeating existing organizations while preventing 
individuals from joining.   
2. The City of Salinas 
This thesis relies heavily upon research conducted in 
the city of Salinas, California.  Salinas is a city of 
148,000 people.  Situated in the central coast of 
California, Salinas is considered an agricultural city.  A 
large percentage of the population is employed in the 
farming industry.  The population has a heavy Hispanic 
ethnicity and a large migrant worker population.  Portions 
                     24  Haussler, 2-35.  Max G. Manwaring, 5-14 
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of the cities poorest neighborhoods have population 
densities of 1,500 people per square acre in two-story 
housing.  This averages to over seven individuals in a two 
bedroom home. 
Within the city limits, there are at least 14 street 
gangs with affiliation falling between the Nortenos or the 
Sorenos.  These two competing local gangs fall under the 
control of Nuestra Familia and the Mexican Mafia 
respectively.  This fault line between two competing gangs 
results in a homicide rate two and a half times the average 
of similar size cities.  The at-risk population for gangs 
constitutes over one quarter of the cities population.  The 
result is that Salinas, although providing limited cross 
sections in ethnicity, provides a primes case study to 
determine individual motivators within a rebel group 
influenced society. 
Interviews were conducted with law enforcement, parole 
officers, politicians, non-profit intervention groups, 
former gang members, and high school age students.  In 
every instance, the individuals interviewed had a minimum 
of ten years in the city. 
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III. WHY THEY JOIN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will demonstrate why individuals, 
especially young males, join street gangs.  By using the 
methodology proposed in the previous chapter it is possible 
to derive the motivations for joining the gang and then 
place them in perspective to the overall decision making 
process of the individual and the common frame.  The 
outcome of this process is a determination of how the 
individual uses the common frame to understand values for 
cost and benefit that the individual uses in making 
decisions. 
1. The Neighborhood 
Within the neighborhood children, get their first 
exposure to gangs through aspects of the society around 
them.  The individual develops their common frame from 
observing the media, news, movies, fashion, friends and 
family alike.  Groups within the society may exert 
influence, such as peer pressure, but the individual youth 
is interpreting to the best of their ability all the inputs 
they see and experience.  Some aspects glamorize gangs, 
some do not, but they all leave an impression.  The youth 
who join the gangs often do so out of a need to belong to 
something and for the gain in power and wealth.  They feel 
a need to prove themselves in the neighborhood.  For many 
kids the neighborhood provides many negative sources.  One 
young male explained it as “I learned that my neighborhood 
could be violent. Everyday I walked to school, and I either 
got into a fight or saw one.”25 
                     25 Dr. Francine Hallcom, “An Urban Ethnography of Latino Street Gangs.” 
Internet site accessed 20 April 2006. http://www.csun.edu/~hcchs006/3.html 
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The gangs of Salinas have a hierarchical leadership or 
a group of leaders to issue orders.  The gang members have 
colors and logos to demonstrate affiliation and allegiance.  
Graffiti denotes the boundaries of different gangs.  
Outside of school grounds there are few limitations on the 
wearing of colors or logos.  Kids are exposed in the 
neighborhood to the propaganda of gangs as often as they 
see advertisements for popular soft drinks.  The advent of 
personal web logs like Myspace.com has provided online 
recruiting tools and exposure.  The neighborhood is an 
aggressive place where young males feel the need to prove 
their worth in relation to other adolescent males.   
Some kids will join for the “juice” or power gained 
through the group and getting a reputation.  "The kids who 
joined gangs were teenagers who did it to gain a feeling of 
power. They join because the gang makes them feel like they 
are part of a family.”26  The gang also provides peers for 
socialization.  The gang can provide identity, discipline, 
recognition, belonging and money.  The kids on the street 
see that the gang has the prospect of providing these 
things and are intrigued by the lifestyle.    
The neighborhood lacks controls other than the 
occasional police patrol.  Parental supervision is limited 
because most families are dual income.  There are few after 
school programs and few jobs that kids desire.  Overall, 
the neighborhoods have a lack of formal or informal social 
structures that are positive.   
The gangs have filled the vacuum and provide a social 
structure, albeit a negative one.  For many years research 
has pointed out that the gang merely fulfills most                      
26 Hallcom, Internet site accessed 20 April2006. 
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adolescent needs; the need for affiliation, belonging, and 
for status. Gangs provide the necessary audience for deeds 
of bravado, a sense of family, and of group membership by 
furnishing friends and camaraderie to unloved and often 
unwanted youngsters.27 
 
B. RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
To provide a simplified means to see the rational 
actor model at work, security was chosen as the research 
topic.  Security, and finding for oneself or a family is a 
core desire of most individuals.  Security is a readily 
apparent topic that individuals being interviewed can 
explain.  The authors of this thesis are not attempting to 
minimize other desires by choosing security.  The intent is 
to exemplify the process the individual goes through in 
making a decision.  Keeping in mind that joining a gang is 
a means, not an end, in the case of young males in a gang 
neighborhood security provides a clear and concise end and 
motivation.   
1. Benefits and Expectations 
To the average young male, who is at the greatest risk 
to joining a gang, the benefits of the gang are simple: 
join and receive money, status, girls, safety, and 
community.  Do not join the gang and the possibility of 
receiving these benefits declines.  To receive the benefit 
of any of the previous mentioned items, participation is 
required.  Security is a clear and consistent desire 
amongst individuals. 
                     
27 Stephen W Barron and David B. Tindal "Network Structure and 
Delinquent Attitudes Within a Juvenile Gang.” Social Networks,(1993) 
Vol 15.No.3, 255-273. 
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 A young male in a city is faced with the need for 
security in an unsecured environment.  This need has values 
associated with it.  Security maintains a high value for 
most individuals. This security is viewed as essential to 
everyday life, but the expectation or probability for 
receiving security is not high for most urban youths in the 
environment.  Police, teachers and parents cannot or do not 
provide a continuous blanket of security.   
Young individuals walking to school in Salinas are 
confronted with multiple security threats in a given day.  
In the morning walking to school, it is not uncommon for 
gangs to shoot in the direction of non-gang members.28  This 
is an extreme example of the security risk individual 
youths experience on a daily basis.  Joining a gang 
eliminates the risk of being confronted by a gang on the 
way to school.   
The benefit to joining appears obvious, because once 
in a gang an individual will have no more fear of being 
abused or exploited.  If expectation cannot be met outside 
the gang, then joining the gang provides the benefit.  The 
expectation of receiving this security benefit is high.  
The value of the benefit is high and the expectation of 
receiving it is high. 
Looking beyond the security needs of the individual, 
the desire to attain recognition, esteem, belonging, or 
monetary gains all provide motivations.  Often, at risk 
children are seeking the things they see as unattainable  
 
 
                     
28 Authors interview, Partnership for Peace annual convention, 
Salinas, 11 November 2005. 
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through normal means.  The benefits the gang provides 
appear great and as explained below the costs of joining 
are low. 
2. Costs and Expectations 
The cost for joining the gang is not as high as 
outsiders perceive it.  The group that makes up the gang 
fulfills more than just security; it provides esteem and 
opportunities for money and socialization.  The individual 
referencing the common frame devalues the cost of 
incarceration and for a juvenile the expectation of serious 
jail is low.  The state legal system is designed in such a 
way that parents have severe restrictions on their ability 
to punish children and the state does not provide enough.  
The opportunity cost to security of not joining can be 
high.  It would entail providing security against every 
gang and hoodlum on the street. 
 Over the course of time, the pure preference of the 
individual is not to avoid illegal acts, but to provide for 
oneself.  The common frame will address this further, but a 
sense of right and wrong are not tied to legality, they are 
tied to the individual’s valuation of the act.  The cost of 
incarceration is low and the expectation is low. The cost 
of getting hurt or killed in the gang is low even with a 
moderate expectation.  The result is that many individuals 
see the utility of joining.  Add selective incentives to 
the equation and it becomes more apparent why individuals 
join. 
 In the gang neighborhoods of Salinas, a male is 
considered adult at age 16, but they still have to answer 
core questions about themselves.  They ask themselves “How 
do I become a man?”  To the outsider being successfully 
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employed or providing for one’s family are core elements of 
male identity.  For a young male in Salinas who sees most 
job prospects as working in the fields or at another 
minimum wage job those aspects of manhood are irrelevant.  
“Additionally, in areas of concentrated poverty, young 
males may have no role models for being a successful male. 
Gangs provide a very simple and accessible definition of 
manhood. A man is someone who is loyal to his friends and 
ruthless to his enemies. You don't need to be able to 
support a family to be adequate as a man. You only need to 
be willing to fight.”29 
3. Control and Selective Incentives 
As proposed in the theory chapter, groups or 
individuals who have control can apply selective incentives 
to modify the rational actor model.  A common example found 
in the gang neighborhood is the use of the threat of 
physical harm to modify an individual’s choice to join.  As 
described earlier, in Salinas gangs will shoot in the 
general direction of non-gang members on their way to 
school.  Selectively applied to individual school children, 
this threat of harm provides a selective incentive to the 
individual receiving the fire.  Joining the gang takes 
advantage of the benefit of security while mitigating the 
selective cost. 
 The ability to apply selective incentives is the 
direct result of the control the gang has over the 
neighborhood.  The gang’s control is the pump that allows 
the gang to maintain future authority. Selective incentives 
applied to individuals have an effect on everyone who hears 
                     29 Dr. Prothrow-Stith., Director of the Division of Public Health Practice. 
Harvard University. March 2005. as cited from internet  
http://www.children.smartlibrary.org/NewInterface/segment.cfm?segment=207 
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the story. The neighborhood that has higher expectations of 
selective incentives being applied by the gang cedes 
control to the gang.  
 The state or gang who has constant presence can exert 
the most control.  The individual may have a dislike 
against the gang, but if the gang maintains the most 
presence in the neighborhood, and therefore control, the 
individual will look to join the gang.  A common social 
atmosphere in Salinas is kids spending their time on the 
street.   Both parents work and the house provides little 
personal space.  The result of this environment is that 
kids spend time sitting on the street.  This takes place at 
the age where kids are most vulnerable to recruitment and 
are most isolated from the social forces that would prevent 
them joining gangs.30 When this situation exists, they 
become prey to the gang.  Alone they cannot combat the 
influences of the gang.31  Older gang members identify these 
street corner kids and befriend them.32  These older gang 
members provide security and guidance.  The contact they 
have provides control over the perceived benefits and 
costs.  The fact that these older gang members can maintain 
high levels of contact mean they provide a clear 
understanding to the youth of what expectations are in the 
neighborhood and ensures gang control is established. 
 An extreme example of coercive selective incentives is 
exemplified by a pedophile’s use of photos of his acts of 
molestation to extort children into working for a gang. 
                     30 Snow, 794. 
31 Anna Caballero, Mayor of the City of Salinas., Interview conducted with 
authors 6 October 2005. 
32 Authors interview, Partnership for Peace annual convention, 
Salinas, 11 Nov.  The authors had the opportunity to meet and speak 
with parole and gang intervention officers. November 2005 
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He participates by essentially victimizing 7- and 
8-year-olds, sodomizing them, photographing that, 
and then using that as blackmail, threatening to 
show their mothers the pictures, and then getting 
them to run crimes on behalf of the gang.33   
This example demonstrates the use of selective 
incentives to force individuals to join gangs.  The use of 
coercion served to force individuals across a psychological 
line.  Once across this line further coercion is not 
required.  Two compounding factors ensure the individual 
supports the gang.  The first is the fear of exposure from 
the act of molestation.  The second is fear of exposure of 
the subsequent illegal acts committed for the gang.  
Examples of extreme coercion also serve to demonstrate how 
selective incentives cede control to the gang.  Once this 
control is established, the individual’s perception of the 
common frame is changed.  
 
C. COMMON FRAME 
The methodology chapter described the function of the 
sum of all the rational choice decisions over time 
establishing the common frame amongst individuals.  This 
common frame is how an individual reads to establish the 
values they are going to place on costs, benefits, 
expectations, and control.   
Society has the ability to retain the knowledge of 
multiple decisions.  Individuals within the gang know that 
the gang can affect them.   The common frame of the 
neighborhood serves as a recorder for the effects of the 
gang and testimony of its control. 
                     33 Congressional Judiciary committee hearing. Combating Gang Violence in 
America: Examining Effective Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement 
Strategies.  September 17, 2002 No. J-108-42, 15. 
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A prime example of the rational choice of individuals 
influencing the common frame is conveyed by Meares and 
Kahan in describing the proliferation of guns,  
Once a few youths outside of the drug market 
acquire guns, the perception that gun carrying 
has become a general phenomenon rather than a 
drug-specific one can generate higher levels of 
fear among youths, which in turn support ever 
higher levels of gun carrying.34  
The common frame, when referenced by the individual, 
displays a norm that carrying a gun is allowable.  Once the 
norm hits a tipping point, gun carrying becomes established 
as a long-term social fact.  This fact coupled with 
aggressive posturing35 for safety reasons, further 
establishes a gang centric common frame. 
 
D. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
The rational actor model is an excellent tool to 
understand why individuals join gangs.  Although this 
thesis primarily focuses on the common frame in relation to 
the rational actor model, additional conditions that 
influence the individuals must be addressed.  
1. Demographic Motivators  
At the forefront of these factors is the demographic 
motivation that makes up gang members.  Over ninety percent 
of gang members are male and ages nine to seventeen are the 
highest risk to joining.36  This demographic fact 
demonstrates that the angst or wanderlust37 of young males 
                     34 Meares Kahan, 820-822. 
35 Meares Kahan, 810-825. 
36 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment. Bureau of Justice Assistance BJA 
2003-DD-BX-0311, U.S. Department of Justice 
37 Thrasher, 167. 
34 
contributes to the rational actor equation.  Young males 
desire excitement, they want to impress girls, and they 
will take risks that older males usually would not.  This 
additional factor contributes to the susceptibility of 
young males to join insurgencies for the excitement. The 
target demographic of the gang has, “Individuals [who] will 
be more available for movement exploration and 
participation because of the possession of unscheduled or 
discretionary time and because of minimal countervailing 
risks or sanctions.”38 
2. Needs Fulfillment 
The decisions faced by individuals are tied directly 
to a need.  These needs are hierarchical in nature and 
therefore have the ability to prioritize the actions of the 
individual.  If the physiological needs of food and shelter 
are met, the individual will seek the next lower need.  The 
gang can meet three of the four most basic needs of an 
individual.  The gang cannot necessarily provide 
physiological needs, but it can provide safety, belonging, 
and esteem.  All of which must be met before an individual 
can know and understand themselves or take on higher 
learning.39 
3. Stair Step to Membership 
R. Horowitz describes the thin line to cross to become 
a member, “The symbolic segregation of gang and non-gang 
youth is tenuous.”40  This reality allows for simple 
recruitment.  Mobilization of individuals into the gang 
requires little beyond time and silence. This low cost with 
                     38 Snow, 464-481. 
39 A. H. Maslow, “A theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review. V. 
50, 370-396 
40 R. Horowitz, Honor and the American Dream: Culture and Identity in a 
Chicano Community, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1983.446. 
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a marginal safety benefit makes the individual decision to 
join simple.  With entire family lineages joining gangs, 
the individual looking at the common frame sees a neutral 
if not beneficial image of gang involvement.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The youth within a gang neighborhood join gangs for 
various reasons.  The important factor is that when you 
look closely at the neighborhood the reasons they join are 
rational within the context of the neighborhood.   Over 
time the numerous decisions made by individuals concerning 
whether to join or not join develops into a common frame.  
The targeted, potential gang population references this 
common frame when making decisions.  This reference lets 
the individual understand the values for the cost, benefit 
and expectation from all the youth’s influences concerning 
joining or not joining a gang. The aggregate of these 
decisions form a common frame of society for these youth.  
This perception shows control and authority is in the hands 
of the gangs.  This leads to a near one-hundred percent 
expectation that a gang can follow through on its threats 
of applying selective incentives, both positive and 
negative compared to other influences like the government. 
The youths in the gang neighborhood have a different 
view of how they are supposed to survive and succeed.  A 
large portion of their view on life comes from the common 
frame that they developed in their neighborhood.   Using 
their view, they may take a shortsighted look to what 
options they have, or they might not understand that they 
have a lot more options.  Another possibility is they 
receive flawed information from their common frame that 
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they then use to base decisions on.  Overall, to the youth 
in the gang neighborhood with their existing common frame, 
it is a rational decision to join the gang.  After looking 
at the problem, it seems much more surprising that some 
kids do not join the gang.  
Counterinsurgency and counter gang strategy benefit 
from understanding why individuals join because once 
answered, prevention technique development is possible.  To 
defeat existing rebel groups, strategies historically 
focused in three directions: prevention, intervention and 
violence suppression.  Once the common frame of the costs 
and benefits are understood in a community, the prevention 
strategy can be developed to limit the numbers joining the 
rebel group. To properly do this the authorities will have 
to alter the common frame that the prospective members are 
using to make their decisions.  The next chapter will 
examine why individuals stay in, and by answering this 
question, lead to how intervention strategies can be 
developed.   
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IV. WHY THEY STAY IN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The rebel organization provides a new or updated value 
of benefits for the individual.  This chapter answers the 
question of why individuals, despite the cost, stay in 
gangs.  It answers how the benefits are viewed as so great 
from within the gang.  The rational choice of an individual 
to stay in is based on the rational actor model with values 
provided by the group that has authority and control.  This 
reflects the updated expectations of receiving benefits, 
based on the selective incentives to achieve them.  The 
common frame of the group further reinforces this new 
benefit value.   
 
B. RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
1. Benefits and Expectations 
The members of gangs clearly receive various benefits 
for staying in a gang.  The focus is on, “Things you can 
have, not what the sense of community is.”41   Membership in 
the gang provides a greater utility value for effort than 
the average youth receives for working in the agricultural 
fields or other low wage jobs. Members of the gang see a 
reasonable expectation of receiving benefits they could not 
easily achieve otherwise given the past performance of the 
group.   
Once an individual is within the gang the expectations 
for receiving the benefits does increase.  Current culture 
within the gang community provides limited expectations 
                     41 Anna Caballero, Mayor of the City of Salinas., Interview conducted with 
authors 6 October 2005.  
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outside that of the gang.  “Kids respond to what [their] 
society expects of them.”42  This quote from the Mayor of 
Salinas demonstrates the common frame within the gang 
communities, that the society has established expectations 
that lead individuals into gangs.  Maintaining the 
solidarity can also provide means to increased power, even 
in prison.   
2. Costs and Expectations 
The cost of continued membership is low.  Parents have 
extremely limited powers within the state to punish their 
children.  The state has limited itself concerning options 
for punishing delinquent children.  The existing cost 
mechanism, of the threat of prison, is intended to deter 
involvement in gangs, but prevents intervention until a 
serious crime has been committed. 
Continued membership in the gang requires only a 
limited amount of direct costs.  Attending weekly meetings 
is often the only requirement to prove continued support.43  
If the individual gang member wants more they can increase 
the efforts, but there are very few “musts” when an 
individual is in the gang.  The level of support each 
member of the gang is required to put forth varies upon his 
or her status in the gang and desire to move up the rank 
structure.  Shi described that, “most people only need to 
go to the weekly meetings to maintain membership.”44  State, 
federal and local laws prevent parents from intervening in 
many instances until it is too late.  Mayor Caballero 
                     42 Anna Caballero, Mayor of the City of Salinas., Interview conducted with 
authors 6 October, 2005.   
43 Shi Coda, Authors interview 14 November, 2005.  Shi is a youth program 
coordinator for “Second Chance” 
44 Shi Coda, Authors interview 14 November, 2005.  Shi is a youth program 
coordinator for “Second Chance” 
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pointed out that, “Parents feel they have no power to 
punish their children, they feel the laws prevent them from 
acting.”45  Compounding the problem of parental restraint, 
gang enforcement policies fall short of desired results.46 
While the gang can enforce costs of severe physical pain 
for loss of allegiance, the authorities have a very low 
level of expectation for providing any deterrence. 
Selective disincentives within a social network 
influence the individual. Part of the shift in the dommon 
frame for an individual once they are in a rebellious 
organization is the disincentives associated with the fear 
of being ostracized.  Social networks, formalized or 
informal, have great effects upon an individual.  The 
common frame for the individual is changed, as discussed 
above.  Critical as well is the understanding that an 
individual, once part of a group, generally wishes to stay 
within the group.47  This is caveat with the understanding 
the organization must maintain some semblance of the same 
ends, ways, and means as the individual.  A rift between 
the understanding of ends, ways, and means between a member 
of the group and the rest of the members of the group would 
result in a defection by the individual member.   
3. Control and Selective Incentives 
Members of a rebellious group have further selective 
disincentives that preclude leaving in the form of 
                     45 Anna Caballero, Mayor of the City of Salinas., Interview conducted with 
authors 6 October 2005. 
46 Anna Caballero, Mayor of the City of Salinas., Interview conducted with 
authors 6 October 2005. 
- -Diana Timmons., Authors interview, November, 2005. Diana is a School 
teacher heavily involved in prevention and intervention programs. 
47 Andrew R. Molnar, “Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies.” (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1965),80-
82. 
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coercion. Individuals may have been intensively recruited 
or coerced into a rebellious organization, and face serious 
repercussions for leaving.48 Selective disincentives within 
a social network influence the individual. Part of the 
shift in the common frame for an individual once they are 
in a rebellious organization is the disincentives 
associated with the fear of being ostracized.  Social 
networks, formalized or informal, have great effects upon 
an individual.  For prolonged serious delinquency to 
emerge, however, association with other delinquent youth 
within a network is required. Once these delinquent 
patterns emerge, they have feedback effects, further 
eroding the person's bond to other influences and non-
delinquent social networks. These mutually reinforcing 
effects create trajectories toward increasing levels of 
involvement in delinquency.49  This ensures that once a 
youth enters a gang the continued socialization with other 
gang members changes his common frame.  In a way the 
individual has accepted a change to the values encompassed 
by the common frame that are continually reaffirmed by the 
other gang member.  Outside influences are severely limited 
from being able to modify the individual gang member’s 
common frame.  This problem explains the reason numerous 
people within Salinas stated that the priority is 
preventing kids from joining, once they are in the gang it 
is very difficult to reach them.    
 
                     48 Johnstone, J. W. C. (1983). Recruitment to a youth gang. Youth and 
Society, 14, 281-300. 
Jamie Stockwell. Convicted gang members Urged to Help Teens. The Washington 
Post. Sep. 10, 2005. p B-03.  Threats of violence for braking a code of silence 
are valid and executed on a regular basis.  
49 Gang membership, Delinquent Peers and Delinquent Behavior, 10/98, NCJ 
182990, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ 171119. 
41 
a. Social Network Theory 
The insulating effect of social networks directly 
affects the individual’s common frame. Social network 
theory is a complementary perspective that focuses on the 
impact of the social groups, on networks, in which the 
person is involved. All networks control the behavior of 
their members and channel that behavior toward consistency 
with group norms. “Movements foster identity construction 
(or reconstruction) and encourage social bonds that 
facilitate joining by creating a new social network and 
solidarity to encourage individuals to stay the course and 
continue.”50  Networks increase the likelihood of conforming 
behavior; criminal network (e.g.,gangs) increases the 
likelihood of delinquent behavior. The more pervasive the 
network is in a person's life, the more powerful the effect 
it has on his or her behavior.51   
All of the factors of common frames, selective 
incentives, and control are interacting to create a bond 
between the members of the group. The rebellious 
organization is an informal social institution and 
therefore subject to many of the same group psychological 
rules.  Questioning the direction of the group calls into 
question the very validity of having joined the group. 
Compounding this is the bond between the members of the 





                     50  Wiktorowitz, 10. 
51  Gang membership, Delinquent Peers and Delinquent Behavior, 10/98, NCJ 
182990, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ 171119. 
42 
b. Physical Manifestations of Loyalty and 
Affiliation 
The use of tattoos, colors, and tags to maintain 
a physical and psychological affiliation serves to induce 
further loyalty.52  The initial oath of allegiance often 
centers around, “blood in, blood out.”  This blood 
allegiance to the community ensures mutual support from 
members while tying it to an actual cost.  This oath serves 
to ensure individuals cross a line.  By crossing into the 
world of the gang member, individuals are less inclined to 
assist the police, their family, or any other outsider.  
The physical manifestation serves as a negative incentive. 
 
C. COMMON FRAME AMONGST GANG INDIVIDUALS 
Shi came from a family that was gang affiliated.  Her 
father is a former gang member and her brother is a current 
member.  Beyond the immediate family affiliation, the gang 
expanded the communal ties throughout a neighborhood.53  The 
gang provided enhanced structure and control within the 
social network.  This enhanced community structure is met 
by maintaining membership in the gang. 
The reinterpretation of one’s common frame influences 
the individual who has joined the rebel group because it 
creates a boundary between perceived outsiders and 
insiders.  The individual in the rebel group has adopted a 
new benefit valuation based on interpretations of the 
common frame.  The new preference structure of the 
individual assures that the duration and strength of the 
                     52 Andrew R. Molnar, “Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies.” Special Operations Research Office, Washington D.C. 1965. p.80-
81. 
53 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment. Bureau of Justice Assistance BJA 
2003-DD-BX-0311, U.S. Department of Justice 
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inputs coming from the rebel group will outweigh all other 
influences.  This creates the boundary between those who 
are not receiving the same level of influence from the 
rebel group, and those who do.  Family, church, and school 
will have to work harder and longer to overcome the 
enduring influences of the rebel group.    
With continuous socialization among other members who 
maintain the same preferences an individual new to the 
group will affirm the expectations of receiving incentives.  
This continuous reaffirmation between members maintains a 
stronger enhancing effect to staying in the group versus 
the dampening effect provided by the risk of violence or 
incarceration. 
 
D. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
In the previous chapter the topic of demographic 
behavior was useful for understanding motivations.  Simply 
put – young boys are looking for excitement and that makes 
them more susceptible to recruitment into a gang.  Most of 
these individuals eventually leave the gang.  The majority 
of the cases where individuals get out they gradually 
lessen their involvement.  This lessening involvement 
coincides with age.  These individuals leave because the 
excitement or wanderlust that is associated with youth is 
replaced with adult responsibilities.  Much of the reasons 
for getting out of a gang are explained through the 
rational actor model.  The possible costs on wives and 
children outweigh the benefits of staying in. 
What the rational actor model cannot explain is the 
waning desire for excitement and the increased need for 
stability that adults develop with age.  Most gang members 
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are under the age of twenty-five.  Older members that do 
stay in typically are entrenched in the gang following 
incarceration. 
Similar to the line being crossed by a terrorist these 
individuals were drawn in to the gang life until they hit a 
point they felt they could not cross back into normal life.  
Moghaddam argues that the recruits face two uncompromising 
forces.  From within the organization the pressure to 
conform to the others in the group creates a boundary 
between the current life and previous social ties.  The 
individual is also threatened by the repercussions from law 
enforcement.54 
Another important factor that came up numerous times 
in discussion with gang experts in Salinas is that 
membership does not mean continuous participation.  Once a 
individual joins a gang the amount a individual 
participates can be adjusted.  Even though they may not 
operate daily for the gang even a part time member can 
increase their participation when the gang requires more 
activity or when they choose to for personal gain.  
  
E. CONCLUSION 
Until something more tangible comes within reach of 
the average gang member, there is little reason to leave 
the gang.  The rational decision based on the gang members 
common frame it to stay in the gang.  The gang feeds the 
common frame that the individual is using to interpret 
society to make decisions.  Once in the gang the influences 
are more balanced and could provide a way to modify the 
                     54 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological 
Exploration,” American Psychologist, Feb-Mar 2005, pp.161-169 
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common frame are diminished.  This in turn prevents the 
individual from gathering information that would affect the 
rational decision process and lead them to leave the gang.   
If incarcerated the influences become stronger.  If jail is 
avoided the involvement will wane, but in many cases 
allegiances and connections will always exist.55   
One topic that is not clearly understood is that the 
degree of participation amongst gang members is not equal.  
Some individuals may only go to weekly meetings, where 
others participate on a daily basis in conducting gang 
business.  This creates a gang of unknown size that can 
adjust its size based on requirements or demand for people.  
Important to the greater common frame is that with 
every individual maintaining membership in the gang, it is 
one more series of decisions that feed the control of the 
gang.  The cycle perpetuates itself through membership and 
there are limited options to interrupt the cycle.  The 
options have to have enough weight and duration to 
interrupt and reverse the perpetuating cycle. 
Francine Hallcomb discussed the psychological 
phenomenon of youth activity in gangs well, “Delinquent 
youths, however, find psychological reward in disobeying 
the law as well as material reward in the profits garnered 
from illicit sales of drugs and stolen goods. They secure 
further reward in defying the power of authorities, of 
parents, and of the society at large. They receive still 
more psychic rewards at the hands of their delinquent peers 
whose approval and respect they gain. Consequently, ‘doing 
time’ or ‘going to Juvie’-- as juvenile detention centers 
                     55 Galindo, Letticia D.(1993) "The Language of Gangs, Drugs, and Prison Life 
Among Chicanas” Latino Studies Jorurnal Sep 1, Vol 4, No. #, 23 
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are commonly referred to--simply boosts their status among 
the group.”56  This boost of credibility prevents the 
deterrence of continued membership from being effective. 
 Once an individual enters the gang it is very rational 
for the individual to make decisions to not leave the gang.  
Though allegiance and social ties may continue actual 
participation may grow or decline, completely severing ties 
with the gang usually does not happen unless the individual 
goes through drastic change.  The drastic change allows the 
individuals to see the changes within their common frame, 
which then allows them to make the then rational decision 
to leave the gang.   
Understanding this process is important when 
attempting to get an individual to leave a rebel group.  
This process also shows how difficult it is for an outsider 
to convince a gang member or insurgent to leave their 
group.  For an outsider to influence gang members to leave 
they first must establish control in the gang neighborhood 
so the individual has a high expectation that the outsider 
can apply selective incentives.  Over time this new 
situation will change the common frame of the gang members 
and it will become a rational decision to leave the gang.  
In the next chapter, we will look at the reasons why 
people in the neighborhood passively support the gang.  
when that question is answered, strategies to get the 
neighborhood to actively rise up against the gang can be 
developed.  
  
                     56 Hallcom, Internet site accessed, 20 April 2006 
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V. WHY NEIHBORHOODS PASSIVELY SUPPORT GANGS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As seen in the reasoning behind joining or staying in 
gangs, control and common frames play pivotal roles in the 
establishing of values for a rational decision.  By 
applying the same methodology previously used, the 
reasoning for passivity on the part of neighborhoods is 
understood.  Passive support is the allowance of the growth 
of the gang by a neighborhood.  By not fighting the gang 
and its control over the neighborhood, the individual 
supports it.   
This chapter proposes that the rational choices of the 
individuals in the neighborhood to not fight the gang 
within the neighborhood modifies the common frame and gives  
control to the gang.  This action simultaneously provides a 
reference for values associated with costs and benefits.  
The result of this action is a cycle where the rational 
action provides a common frame, which gives the impression 
of control to the gang and low benefits for fighting the 
gang.  This furthers the rational choice to passively 
support the gang. This recurring cycle, if uninterrupted, 
results in a community that will not escape gang violence. 
 
B. RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
The rational actor model within the neighborhood takes 
on a completely new perspective when a public good is 
concerned.  To not passively support the gang, an 
individual has to speak out against them.  The individual 
has to take on additional burdens and incur more cost.  The 
benefit, even if successful is split amongst the entire 
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neighborhood.  Even those who do not assist in ridding the 
neighborhood of the gang will benefit, so free riders are 
common.   
The requirement for incentives is directly linked to 
rational choice theorists and the focus on Mancur Olson’s 
public-goods dilemma. The dilemma faced by the community is 
founded upon rational theory that an individual will work 
for their best interest.  A community fails when they 
cannot overcome the collective good problem. If the public 
good cannot be directly linked to the individual, no 
members will participate. To overcome this problem 
selective incentives are required to motivate the community 
as a whole.   
1. Benefits and Expectations 
At the core of the neighborhood is the individual who 
must decide whether to participate or not in the gang.  The 
free-rider principle is the first hurdle for any 
neighborhood.  Using the rational actor model in a 
prisoners’ dilemma demonstrates why individuals do not see 
the benefit of participating in an endeavor to stop the 
gang.  If every individual shares in the benefit, then 
there is no motivation to incur cost. 
 Most gang neighborhoods have concentrated 
underemployment, unemployment, and poor social ties.  This 
lack of income has a direct linkage to home ownership.57  
Lack of home ownership eliminates a potential individual 
financial benefit to reducing crime.  Lowering crime rates 
has the effect of increasing home values.  To the 
economically disadvantaged non-homeowner, this fact is 
irrelevant.  The result is a lack of benefit beyond 
                     57 Sampson the new economy 
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personal security.  It is often just as advantageous to use 
the gang for security, as it is to use the police. 
 Another example of where the benefit of collective 
action does not exist is when we look at the parents that 
support the Salinas school system through the school watch 
program. The “Parent Patrol” maintains a very limited force 
of volunteer parents wearing uniform windbreakers and 
carrying radios.  These parents ensure that students travel 
too and from school with adults providing security, less 
than five percent of the parents participate in this 
program.58  The entire community benefits from the endeavors 
of these individuals and the cost is entirely on those who 
participate.   
 Overall, the examples of the lack of clear benefits 
for collective action shows how the opposite of collective 
action or passive support provides benefit, to the 
individual. 
2. Costs and Expectations 
The benefits to the individual who passively support 
the gang in terms of security are very real.  The benefits 
of working against the gang are less tangible and tied to 
the social norms and values of being a civic leader.  The 
costs of not passively supporting the gang are fraught with 
problems in terms of risk, legitimacy, availability and 
effectiveness.59  The action of not passively supporting the 
gang has a higher perceived risk, which equates to a 
potential cost in the rational actors mind.  The result is 
                     58 Interview with authors, Partnership for Peace annual convention, 11 
November 2005. 
59 Marco Giugni and Florence Passey. “Social Networks and Individual 
Perceptions: Explaining Differential Participation in Social Movements” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No.1. (Mar.,2001), 123-153. 
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lower participation in speaking out against the gang.  As 
the gang gains more legitimacy in the neighborhood, 
individuals see the authority of the government lessening 
and so the effectiveness of speaking out against the gang 
lessens.  Add the cost in time, or personnel availability 
to fight the gang and it becomes apparent that there are 
many costs with relatively high expectations in not 
passively supporting.  
Leonardo Bocanegra describes the establishment of 
unwritten rules in the community, a constitution that 
everyone abides by,  
There are rules for people in my neighborhood. 
The rules are fairly easy. Everybody sees you and 
you see them sooner or later. Then when you go 
out shopping or whatever, people give you looks 
which mean `Hi,' without saying it. They give you 
a nod of some sort which establishes recognition. 
They know and you know; you are both from the 
same neighborhood. Even though I do not know who 
the person is by name, I have seen him or her 
before and I must acknowledge that in some way 
through body language. There are rules about 
keeping quiet, too. You never witness anything; 
you never know anything about the crimes that you 
see committed right under your nose, unless you 
want to get killed.60 
This unwritten set of rules, or constitution, prevents 
anyone in the community from speaking out without first 
weighing the possible cost. 
3. Control and Selective Incentives 
Control within the neighborhood provides one side of a 
decision matrix for an individual to decide whether to 
passively support the gang.  The other axis of the 
framework is the individual’s preference to the gang or the 
                     
60 Hallcom, Internet site accessed 20 April 2006. 
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government.  The result is a framework where the majority 
of the time it is economical and safest for the individual 
to remain silent.  It is only in areas that are controlled 
by the government, and therefore not a serious problem, 
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Figure 2.   Passivity matrix. 
 
 With the perception that the gang is in control the 
individual is unlikely to speak out against the gang.  The 
paradox is that an individual is most likely to speak out 
only when they feel safest.  This is the time when they are 
least needed.     
 The perception of control is as real and powerful tool 
as selective incentives.  Witness intimidation is thought 
of as a problem in gang related criminal cases.  National                      61 Hicks and Associates. Unpublished briefing on Iraq and Civilian 
intimidation of population. (November 2004). 
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Institute of Justice Studies have shown that fifty-seven 
percent of witnesses fear retribution from gangs for their 
testimony in a criminal proceeding.  Less than a quarter of 
those who fear retribution had ever heard of an actual case 
of gang retribution.  The Salinas Chief of Police stated 
“In twelve gang cases none of them [the witnesses] have 
ever been intimidated by gangs.”  The existing common frame 
produces fear of retribution that is necessary in Salinas 
for a large percentage of people to provide information 
against the gang.  The result is a perpetuation of the 
common frame of retribution against witnesses. In New York,  
Prosecutors report that the mere fact that a 
crime is gang-related can be sufficient to 
prevent an entire neighborhood from cooperating. 
This type of community-wide intimidation is 
especially frustrating for prosecutors and police 
investigators because, while no actionable threat 
is ever made in a given case--thereby precluding 
conventional responses--witnesses and victims are 
still discouraged from testifying.62 
 The same problem persists across the country in gang 
neighborhoods.  Indirect means of intimidation are 
perpetuated through the common frame. 
 
C. COMMON FRAME 
With few individuals attempting to stop the gang the 
majority of the neighborhood population is left to 
passively support the gang.  Distrust, estrangement, 
segmentation and social distance all become characteristics 
of the inner city community.63  Everyone becomes equally 
vulnerable to assaults at any point in time, day or night.  
                     62 House Report 105-258 – Witness Protection and Interstate Relocation Act 
of 1997 
63 Spergel, 62. 
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The process is socialization of a destructive nature where 
the lack of community resources is compounded with 
insufficient social support in the home.  Individuals use 
the common frame to learn behavior through attachment to a 
variety of semi-organized illegitimate and criminal 
organizations.64  The common frame is made of passive 
people, which equates to a norm of society. 
Over time, as a gang increases in size and control it 
becomes entrenched and a provider of law and order.65  Corey 
Wilson was cited for his forceful point, “It’s Like, now I 
think about myself living in Saints territory.  That is the 
most important thing, ‘cause they the ones who do stuff 
around here, they clean up, give money to people who need 
food, you know, they the ones who really, you know, affect 
how you live.”66  The gang replaced the state as a provider 
because there was no opposition to it during the gangs 
growth.  Individuals began to perceive the gang as the best 
provider of needs, not the state.  The more individuals 
socialized, the more this message of gang supremacy was 
conveyed. Eventually the majority of the individuals in the 
neighborhood believed the gang was the only answer. 
 
D. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
1. Collective Efficacy 
Collective efficacy is a key social process that links 
cohesion and trust with shared expectations for intervening 
                     64 Spergel, 64. 
65 Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh.  “The Social Organization of Street Gang 
Activity in an Urban ghetto.”  The American Journal of Sociology, Vol.103, No.1 
(Jul.,1997), 82-111. 
66 Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh,  104. 
54 
in support of neighborhood social control.67 Robert Sampson, 
a sociologist at Harvard University, focuses on collective 
efficacy and its influence upon the individuals in a 
neighborhood.  Sampson coins the term collective efficacy 
to, “Signify an emphasis on shared beliefs in a 
neighborhood’s conjoint capability for action to achieve an 
intended effect and hence an active sense of engagements on 
the part of the residents.”68  It is the capacity of 
residents to achieve social control over the environment 
and to engage in collective action for the common good. The 
collective efficacy of a neighborhood directly affects its 
ability to organize and resist a gang.  The physical signs 
of decay of a neighborhood are directly related to this. 
“Visual signs of decay silently but forcefully convey 
messages about affected neighborhoods.  Disorder triggers 
attributions and predictions in the minds of outsiders 
alike.”69 This concept of physical decay sending messages as 
to the ability of a neighborhood to resist is important 
because it reinforces the common frame and the rational 
actor model in giving control over to the gang.  As the 
gang gains more control over the neighborhood the more it 
physically shows signs of this control which prevents the 
neighborhood from realizing it has the ability to fight the 
gang. 
Pamela Oliver’s research on social movements relies 
heavily on Tulock’s influence and how Tulock’s theories are 
                     67  Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush. “Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of ‘Broken Windows’” Social 
Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4. (2004), 319-342. 
68  Robert J. Sampson. “the Neighborhood Context of Well Being.”  
Perspectives in Biology aand Medicine, Vol.46, No.3, (Summer 2003)S-59 
69 Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Disorder in the Urban 
Neighborhoods-Does it lead to crime? National Instittue of Justice: Research in 
Brief.  February 2001. p.1 
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demonstrated in crowds.  Oliver showed how crowds and 
consciousness could be integrated in collective action and 
social movement theory.  Negative incentives used in small 
numbers by organizers of rallies would coerce a much larger 
number of individuals to participate.  This observation 
demonstrates the power of social ties between individuals 
and not just the value  of collective goods and costs.70   
2. Group Victimhood 
There is a significant additional condition within 
neighborhoods found in the theory of group victimhood.  
Using Joseph Montville’s definition of victim, “A state of 
individual and collective ethnic mind that occurs when the 
traditional structures that provide an individual sense of 
security and self-worth through membership in a group are 
shattered by aggressive, violent political outsiders.   
Victimhood can be characterized by either an extreme or 
persistent sense of mortal vulnerability.”71    The gang 
neighborhood further falls into the expanded definition of 
this victimhood by having a history of traumatic aggression 
and loss.  The neighborhood has a belief that the 
aggression and violence suffered is not justifiable.  
Within the neighborhood, there is also a constant fear that 
the aggressor could strike again at any time and that the 
world is indifferent to the plight of the victims.72    
 As groups work toward finding an identity within the 
groups have chosen traumas and glories to identify who is a 
                     70 Pamela E. Oliver. 1-30. 
71 Joseph V. Montville, 'The Psychological Roots of Ethnic and Sectarian 
Terrorism" in the Psychodynamics of International Relationships. Vol. 1, Eds. 
Montville Volkan and Julius (Lexington Books, 1990) 
72 These points were paraphrased and slightly expanded upon from Joseph V. 
Montville, "Psychoanalytic Enlightenment and the Greening of Diplomacy" in 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 37, reprinted in Volkan, 
Psychodynamics and from Healing Function p.113. 
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member of the group.  This sense of glory gets passed down 
from one generation to the next without regard to whether 
or not the individuals have felt the trauma themselves.  
The result is an unwillingness to get past the feelings of 
victimhood.  This sense of victimhood provides an identity 
within the group.  The trauma proves to be a rallying point 
for the group’s identity, to leave the victim mentality 
behind means disassociating oneself with the group.  This 
also serves to create and maintain low self-esteem.  A 
higher level of distortion in the groups’ perception of 
others and the distinction that others are victimizing you 
is reinforced through group thought process. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The sum of the individuals in the neighborhood making 
decisions concerning passive support demonstrates that it 
becomes hard not to passively support the gang.  The public 
goods dilemma establishes incentives for free riders.  Low 
home ownership and equity in the physical status of the 
neighborhood precludes monetary reasons for fighting the 
gang.  Limited social benefits are achieved by not 
passively supporting.  These factors together with 
additional factors establish a common frame that 
discourages active support of the government and encourages 
passive support of the gang.  As the gang maintains a long-
term presence it establishes a legitimacy that exceeds that 
of the government.  This reinforces the next cycle of 
rational decisions within the neighborhood. 
In gang neighborhoods, the most visible effort to end 
the cycle of violence and gang control is through the use 
of violence suppression units.  These police units suppress 
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violence in an effort to address the symptoms of the gang’s 
control in the communities.  This effort to disrupt the 
cycle of violence is only effective for the duration it is 
employed. Once funding, manpower, and focus are reduced the 
community will return to its previous norms based on the 
common frame.  When the passivity of the community is 
addressed at the same time as why individuals join and stay 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of the thesis was to answer the question 
why do people participate in insurgencies.    Street gangs 
provided the venue to further the body of knowledge and 
test a hypothesis.  The hypothesis of this thesis was that 
individuals are rational actors making decisions based on a 
bounded view of common frames.  The values of cost and 
benefit in this rational choice model were determined by an 
individual’s perception of what they saw and experienced 
around them.  The sum of all the decisions of all the 
people of a neighborhood over time creates the common frame 
that individuals use to determine their values and 
establish pure preferences. 
Although this thesis cannot provide definitive 
statistical evidence of this rational choice-common frame 
cycle, it does demonstrate the utility of using this 
approach for understanding participation in insurgencies.  
Most importantly, the thesis furthers the study of social 
theory in explaining rebellious behavior by individuals. 
 
B. THE THREE QUESTIONS 
The three questions of why individuals join gangs, 
stay in gangs or passively support gangs all demonstrate 
that control is key to the changing of perceptions.  
Control has the ability to create perceptions of authority 
and power that may not exist in actuality.   
1. Why They Join 
Individuals join gangs because the costs are low and 
the benefits high.  Society at does not provide any 
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reasonable alternative.  What alternatives do exist are not 
conveyed frequently enough.  Gang neighborhoods use 
coercion to gain new members, but it is not in a directed 
or unified manner.  The reality is that the common frame 
helps an individual make the decision to adopt the gang 
culture.  This provides more control over inputs into the 
common frame by the gang.  The result is that every new 
member of the gang is also an investment in the next 
generation of gang member without any additional costs to 
the gang. 
2. Why They Stay In 
Staying in the gang is cheap and easy in the rational 
actor model.  Compound the low cost with moderate benefits 
and social network ties and the reasons for getting out 
become few.  Most gang members have to gain something new 
to replace the benefits of the gang.  Building family 
replaces the gang family.  Growing older and having more 
responsibility with lessened desire for excitement 
eventually draws active membership down.  Many inactive 
members still maintain sympathy for the gang if not a 
moderate role of support.  These individuals serve to 
perpetuate the cycle of control the gang has over a 
neighborhood. 
3. Why Neighborhoods Passively Support 
The average gang neighborhood ceded control to the 
gang years ago.  Even as communities fight to keep their 
children out of the gangs they do not actively attempt to 
wrest control from the gang.  The police are often looked 
at to solve the problem, but suppression alone does not end 
the cycle.  The neighborhoods are faced with a traditional 
public goods dilemma compounded with a security paradox.  
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Individuals do not want to speak out until it is safe, but 
the community cannot become safe until people speak out. 
 
C. IMPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
  The impact of this thesis is in its ability to 
explain how authority and control are achieved in a 
neighborhood.  The gang may use selective incentives to 
initiate control, but in the maintenance of control, very 
little is needed.  The common frame captures the gang’s 
control and creates a log of it so it continues to maintain 










Figure 3.   Growth of Control [From Common Frames]. 
 
D. FUTURE STUDIES 
There are two possible avenues for further research. 
The first avenue would attempt to prove or disprove this 
thesis through statistical analysis.  The second avenue 
looks for historical examples of how common frames have 
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changed in gang neighborhoods.  These studies would provide 
data on the level of effort necessary to affect long term 
change in a neighborhood.    
 
E. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
The realization that it takes relatively little effort 
to maintain control of an area means that a much greater 
effort is required to break that hold.  In the development 
of counterinsurgency doctrine, the role of control and its 
perception in the common frame becomes critical to the 
long-term strategy.  To break the cycle of control of rebel 
group may have on a neighborhood means a heavy commitment 
of forces initially.  Once the cycle of control is 
disrupted, the force level required to maintain control 
becomes relatively low if continuous recruitment is 
maintained.   
Similar to the gang’s ability to maintain control, a 
state authority can wrest control of a neighborhood through 
tactics of isolation followed by heavy involvement with the 
community. The state authority then uses the formal and 
informal social controls created to replace the isolation 
and force level required initially. 
Current civil authorities focus efforts to end gang 
violence and break up gangs on a three-pronged approach.  
Prevention, intervention, and suppression are the three 
prongs of the attack.  Each of these efforts relies upon 
the other for success.  All three efforts are equally 
important, but this should not be confused with equal 
resources.  If the authorities endeavor to understand the 
common frame being used by the individuals in the 
neighborhood, they can succeed in developing effective 
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strategies.  To truly counter an insurgent or gang threat 
to the point that they cannot return to control the state 
needs to modify the common frame over time.  If the common 
frame is not modified the individuals in the rebel area 
will reference the historical common frame when making 
decisions no matter what short term action the authority 
has taken.  The control that the insurgency or gang exerts 
on an area is self-correcting when attacked on the margin.  
For long-term change to take effect the decisions 
individuals make need to be modified by changing the common 
frame.  This is a long-term process that takes separating 
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